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Abstract 
It is a worldwide stereotype that Japanese, compared to Americans, are oriented more toward 
collectivism. But this stereotypical notion of more collectivism among Japanese, which typically 
stems from a view that individualism and collectivism stand at opposite ends of a continuum, has 
been filled with dashed empirical findings, especially in a sample of college students. In the 
current study, following the view that individualism and collectivism are two separate concepts 
rather than one with two extremes, we test and compare both individualistic and collectivistic 
tendencies among college students in Japan and the United States. A review of theories and 
research on this dimension of cultural variability across the two diverse cultures and the literature 
on societal pressure of collectivity and on parents as primary socialization agents of culturally 
expected values lead to two hypotheses: 1) Japanese college students tend less toward 
individualism than do Americans, and 2) Japanese college students tend less toward collectivism 
than do Americans. Analysis of identical survey data from college students in Japan and in the 
United States provides strong support for both hypotheses. 
 
 Despite modernization, the old images of Japan held by Westerners, and even among 
Japanese themselves, persist. One of the most important of these images is that Japanese people 
are more collectivistic than Westerners, and especially more so than Americans – a stereotype 
based primarily on an abundance of qualitative studies on stronger ‘group-orientation’ among 
Japanese than among Americans (e.g. Eisenstadt, 1996; Jansen, 2000; McClain, 2002; Parsons, 
1951; Reischauer, 1970; Rosenstone, 1988) and some empirical evidence on lower individualism 
in Japan than in the United States (e.g. Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede and Bond, 1984; Hofstede and 
Hofstede, 2004). 
 Despite this research and the long-running assumption that the Japanese must be 
understood with reference to this value orientation of individualism versus collectivism, we 
argue that this stereotype should be seriously challenged. We question this stereotype in large 
part because this orientation at the individual level may be different from, although not always 
incompatible with, that at the cultural level (e.g. Matsumoto and Juang, 2004) and because this 
stereotype is based on a view that individualism and collectivism are simply opposite ends of the 
same value dimension (e.g. Freeman, 1997; Kagitcibasi, 1987, 1994).  
 During the past 30 years, in cross-cultural psychology and intercultural communication, 
much effort has been devoted to ascertaining the validity of this stereotype (for a meta analysis, 
see Takano and Osaka, 1999; see also Matsumoto and Juang, 2004). Normally culture, as a 
system of knowledge, is believed to influence and guide our behavior by providing us with 
‘interpretations of social life, role expectations, common definitions of situations, and social 
norms’ (Olsen, 1978: 107; see also Keesing, 1974). Questioning the equation of the most 
favorably received cultural-level scores reported by Hofstede (1980) with individual orientation 
toward individualism-collectivism (I-C), however, researchers have attempted to find ways to 
study this value dimension at the individual level. Different researchers have used different 
methodologies. But the majority have concentrated on survey data because they provide the 
greatest opportunity to test a wide variety of items from refinements of Hofstede’s (1980) 
seminal individualism index. Yet, there is no consistency in stronger collectivism among 
Japanese compared to Americans. Especially, when a sample of college students is drawn from 
the two countries, the respondents do not seem to represent the predominant cultural I-C 
tendency (for a concise summary, see Matsumoto, 2002). 
 In nearly all the survey research, the focus has been simply on the differences in 
individualistic and collectivistic tendencies between Japanese and Americans. Thus, little has 
been understood regarding why these differences appear. We contend, however, the explicit 
emphases on societal pressure of collectivity and on early childhood socialization, through which 
children are reinforced by their parents for the culturally expected values, provide a perspective 
for understanding such differences. Beccaria (1963 [1764]) and Bentham (1948 [1780]) indicated 
centuries ago that people are rational beings who exercise free will in making decisions as to 
what they will do. As a result, the greater pressure for collectivity and conformative behavior in 
Japanese society is expected to drive its people into a stronger aversion to collectivism. 
Additionally, Matsumoto (2002) noted recently, but offered no evidence, that the parental role as 
a moral beacon has been descending rapidly in Japan, and it is possible that Japanese children of 
today may be deprived of the opportunity to learn not only an individualistic cultural theme but 
also a collectivistic cultural theme. Therefore, the combination of these two factors, as applied to 
the individual I-C, seem to suggest that Japanese youth might be not only less individualistic but 
also less collectivistic than are Americans, with differences of this still being observed among 
young adults and university students.1 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM IN JAPAN AND THE 
UNITED STATES  
Our expectations concerning the differences in individualistic and collectivistic tendencies of 
college students in Japan and the United States are grounded primarily in 1) Hofstede’s (1980) 
findings on individualistic and collectivistic cultures, 2) the notion of people exercising free will 
in making choices as to what they will do, and 3) previous ideas and research on differences in 
early childhood socialization across the two cultures, as they pertain to parental role as moral 
beacons.   
 The idea that Japan, in contrast to the United States, is more collectivistic has a long 
history. By the late 1800s shortly after the opening of Japan in 1854, some 
Western social scientists such as Percival Lowell (1888) were already putting forth the themes of 
Japan’s ‘lack of individuality’, ‘collectivist orientation’ and other supposed characteristics which 
make the Japanese almost polar opposites of Western civilization (Rosenstone, 1988). The most 
widely known statement on this topic no doubt is Ruth Benedict’s (1946) The Chrysanthemum 
and the Sword (see also Abegglen, 1958). The idea that Japan tends more toward collectivism, 
while the US tends more toward individualism also gained popularity among Japanese scholars 
(e.g. Doi, 1971, 1985; Kawasaki, 1969; Nakane, 1970). ‘Individualism’, in this context, means 
placing an emphasis on individual identity over group identity, individual needs and rights over 
group obligations, and individual pleasure over adherence to group norms (for a discussion of 
individualism in the United States, see Bellah et al., 1985). ‘Collectivism’, on the other hand, 
grants priority to group identity over individual identity, shared in-group beliefs over unique 
individual beliefs, and cooperation with in-group members over maximizing individual outcomes 
(see Gudykunst et al., 1996). 
 In the 1980s, researchers, especially Geert Hofstede (1980; Hofstede and Bond, 1984; see 
also Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993) in the field of crosscultural psychology began 
developing measures of I-C and using these measures to collect data from diverse cultures (see 
also Triandis, 1988, 1990, 1995). In his seminal empirical study of IBM workers around the 
world, Hofstede (1980; see also Hofstede and Hofstede, 2004) reported that the United States 
scored 91 (ranked the first out of 39 countries) on his individualism index (51 is the average 
score), while Japan received a lower score of 46 (ranked the 22nd). Therefore, as the Japanese 
economy came to challenge American economic dominance by the 1980s, one key to differing 
management styles between Western and Japanese corporations could be found with the more 
collectivistic orientation of Japanese employees (for example, see Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1985, 
1990; Lincoln et al., 1995). 
 Since Hofstede’s original formulation and research, others have modified his basic idea. 
Hofstede’s scale items were unique to the workplace. And his research, due to a view that I-C is 
a bipolar continuum, offers no empirical evidence that Japan is indeed more collectivistic than 
the US. In the early 1990s, two measures were developed in the United States, and they have 
now dominated the study of I-C across cultures. They are the individual-level equivalent of the 
cultural variability dimension of I-C and refer to the degree to which people conceive of 
themselves as separate from or connected to others. In the tradition of theory and research on 
‘value orientations’ (e.g. Rokeach, 1973), Schwartz (1990, 1992; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, 
1990) designed more global measures of I-C as general value orientations. Markus and Kitayama 
(1991; see also DeGooyer, 1992) linked the idea to the self-concept literature, distinguishing 
between and measuring an ‘independent self-construal’ (i.e. individualism) versus an 
‘interdependent self-construal’ (i.e. collectivism). In their research, Gudykunst et al. (1996) 
included questionnaire items from refinements of Schwartz’s and Markus and Kitayama’s scales 
and found that Japanese, compared to Americans, scored lower on ‘individualistic value 
orientation’ and ‘independent self-construal’, while they scored higher on ‘collectivistic value 
orientation’ and ‘interdependent self-construal’. 
 While research on individualism tends to yield theoretically predicted outcomes, the 
dustbin of collectivism has been filled with dashed empirical expectations. A recent review of 
the literature led Matsumoto and Juang (2004; see also Takano and Osaka, 1999) to conclude 
that the data collected by Hofstede (1980) support the theory that Japanese are more collectivistic 
than are Americans, but the findings thereafter, especially those from a sample of college 
students, tend to be less supportive. More recently, Matsumoto (2002: 53, italics added) 
concluded that, ‘the stereotype of [Japanese being more collectivistic than Americans] is simply 
not congruent with contemporary Japanese culture and the psychology of the younger 
generations’. For example, Matsumoto et al. (1997) uncover evidence for less collectivistic 
values among Japanese college students than among Americans. Kim et al. (1996) also find that 
Japanese college students have less interdependent and independent self-construals than do 
Americans. The test has added importance because, by examining both individualistic and 
collectivistic tendencies of Japanese and Americans, Kim et al., pointed out the possibility that 
Japanese young adults (i.e. college students) are not only less individualistic but also less 
collectivistic than are Americans. If this speculation is correct, according to Kim et al., the 
Japanese college students are then labeled as ‘marginal’, as opposed to the Americans as 
‘bicultural’. 
 Currently, studies on I-C in Japan and the United States seem headed toward a common 
fate: new measures will be continuously developed and will be applied to narrowly defined 
research questions about differences in I-C in the two cultures, before a theoretically sound 
explanation(s) of the contradictory findings is ever presented. 
 We argue that expanding the research on I-C to encompass societal pressure of 
collectivity and contemporary parental practices permits a better understanding of the 
psychology of younger generations of today beyond the traditional notion of Japanese 
collectivism. Beccaria (1963 [1764]) and Bentham (1948 [1780]) noted centuries ago that people 
are self-serving and rational beings who exercise free will in making choices. As a result, if 
forced to conform, they tend to resist the external power. The theme of rebellion against the 
society, parents, and others can be found throughout Japanese literature. Because the pressure on 
Japanese people to conform is great, the characters of Soseki Natsume’s novels such as ‘Sore 
Kara’ (‘And Then . . .’) ‘K jin’ (‘The Wayfarer’) and ‘Mon’ (‘The Gate’) and those of others’ 
strike a desired emotion to rebel. Consequently, the greater societal pressure to collectivity and 
conformative behavior in the Japanese society should result in a smaller difference in 
collectivistic tendency between Japanese and Americans. 
 Moreover, we argue that the deteriorating role of Japanese parents as those who are the 
primary agents to instill the collectivistic values and the interdependent self-construal into their 
offspring contributes, at least to some extent, to a smaller difference in collectivism between 
Japanese and American youth. Recently, Matsumoto (2002) concurs with this argument as he 
presents renewed opposition to the notion of Japanese being more collectivistic than Americans 
and suggests new directions for research to consider the role of parents as primary socialization 
agents of culturally expected values and self-construals. In today’s Japan, Matsumoto (2002) 
argues, more and more Japanese mothers are willing to ignore behavioral problems as long as 
their children continue to study and earn good grades. Many fathers, too, are reluctant to correct 
their children because they prefer to have pleasant times and feelings with their children during 
little time they share. As a result, according to Matsumoto’s argument, the declining parental role 
as moral beacons in the Japanese family might lead to impedance of their offspring to acquire not 
only individualistic values and an independent self-construal, but also collectivistic values and an 
interdependent self-construal that should be predominant in collectivistic nature of Japanese 
culture.  
 Both Japanese and Americans have seconded that a dearth of firm discipline is a key 
characteristic of the current Japanese childrearing (e.g. Azuma, 1986; Bacon and Ichikawa, 1988; 
Hoffman, 2003). In her cross-cultural study on parenting, Machida (1996; see also Conroy et al., 
1980; Lewis, 1995) finds that Japanese parents, especially mothers, are less inclined than their 
American counterparts to give direct instructions on how to talk, think, and behave. Power et al. 
(1992) also observe that Japanese mothers are more hesitant to respond to child misconduct with 
material and social consequences. Therefore, as the treatment of children appears to be more 
tolerated and lenient in terms of socialization for conscience about right and wrong, a stronger 
tendency for collectivism among Japanese youth compared to Americans is expected to diminish 
over time. 
 This Japanese approach to child-rearing, in fact, plays a key role in preparing children for 
the opportunity structure they will confront as they transition into adulthood. Kerbo and 
McKinstry (1998; see also Rohlen, 1983; Sugimoto, 2003; White, 1987; Yamada, 2000) observe 
that in Japan, unlike the United States, opportunities for success are channeled into an extremely 
tapered selection process with no alternative paths or second chances. Adult outcomes are 
determined during a condensed period of a couple days in spring when a person 18 years of age 
sits for the examination for entrance into the university system. With the aim of preparing their 
children for this examination, along with the lapse of Confucian teachings unlike Korea and 
China (e.g. Sengoku, 2000, 2006), Japanese parents are more and more tolerant of and 
indifferent to inculcating proper social behavior and moral principles. For the Japanese children, 
this results in less likelihood to acquire the culturally expected collectivistic values and 
interdependent self-construal, with a latent effect of pushing them into an ‘apathy’ syndrome 
typically characterized as ‘mukiryoku’ (lethargic) and ‘mukanshin’ (indifference). 
 Additionally, we argue that self-development emphasized in highly individualistic 
American culture, coupled with the greater societal pressure of collectivity and the lack of 
discipline in the Japanese family, provides an interesting insight into a possibility that the 
theoretically predicted cultural dif ference might be even reversed in the direction, thereby 
producing stronger collectivism among American college students compared to their Japanese 
counterparts. At least in the United States, Guisinger and Blatt (1994; see also Kagitcibasi, 
1996a, 1996b; Niedenthal and Beike, 1997) suggest, socialization is predicated on self-
development, by which they mean a mature self attainable from two aspects of developments – 
the development of a sense of independence and the development of interpersonal relatedness. 
These two developmental processes are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they co-vary positively, 
with the development of a mature self in one aspect dependent, at least to some extent, on the 
development of a mature self in the other. Consequently, the stronger tendency of collectivism 
among American youth, compared to Japanese, could result from the socialization of American 
children for cooperation and altruism as aspects of self-development equally as important as 




The arguments above lead to the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1: Japanese college students tend to have a less individualistic value 
 orientation and a less independent self-construal than do Americans. 
Hypothesis 2: Japanese college students tend to have a less collectivistic value 




 Data for this research come from a larger cross-cultural study of individualistic and 
collectivistic orientation in behaviors in Japan and the United States. The two identical surveys 
conducted simultaneously in the two countries allows for more direct comparisons of analysis 
and finding without confounding methodological artifacts. In April 2003, identical 
questionnaires, but in different languages, were administered to samples of students in a public 
university in Japan and a comparable one in the US.2 The US university has a total enrollment 
(graduate and undergraduate) of approximately 22,000 and is within the boundaries of a 
metropolitan area of about 1.1 million inhabitants that also contains the state’s capital. The 
Japanese university has an enrollment of approximately 16,500 students and is located within a 
metropolitan area of about 2.2 million inhabitants that contains the prefecture’s capital city. 
Thus, both the American and the Japanese universities are in large (but not the largest) 
metropolitan areas that include a state/prefecture capital. 
 The data collection instrument, a self-report survey questionnaire, was initially designed 
in English. Through a series of pre-tests, the questionnaire was then translated into Japanese.3 
The survey was administered to both the American and the Japanese university students in the 
same month of the year (April).4 In the United States, respondents were enrolled in an 
Introduction to Sociology course that is taken primarily by freshman and sophomores, few of 
whom have yet declared a major and most of whom will not become sociology majors. In Japan, 
our respondents were registered in the sophomore level courses in a variety of majors, including 
literature, economics, science, engineering, and education.5 
 A total of 443 Japanese and 505 English questionnaires were distributed to the students in 
the Japanese and the US universities, respectively, along with a cover letter indicating that 
participation was voluntary and that all responses were anonymous.6 Nine non-Japanese 
respondents in the Japanese sample and 136 non-white respondents in the US sample were 
eliminated, resulting in 433 Japanese respondents and 369 white Americans.7 In the Japanese 
sample 71.1 percent were male, while in the US sample 43.1 percent were male.8 Other potential 
differences between the two samples were considered that might need to serve as control 
variables. The mean age of the two samples did differ slightly, but significantly, as did the 
percent who had lived in single-adult households. So, as described in more detail below, age and 
family structure are included as control variables. Although the two samples did not differ in 
family socio-economic status, as measured by parental education, it is included in theanalysis. 
 
Measures 
Individualistic and Collectivistic Values 
 One of the most commonly used measures of value orientations is the one developed by 
Gudykunst et al. (1996), designed to tap Schwartz’s (1992) conceptualization of values that serve 
individualistic and collectivistic interests. Our questionnaire included items and response options 
from this study of Japanese and American college students concerning value orientations. To 
measure ‘Individualistic Value-Orientation’ and ‘Collectivistic Value- Orientation’, we asked 
respondents to indicate, on a seven-point scale, ‘how important each of the following values is as 
a guiding principle in your life’. Possible responses ranged from ‘not important at all’ (coded 1) 
to ‘extremely important’ (coded 7). The nine items we included that are identified as 
‘individualistic’ are: a sense of accomplishment, pleasure, ambitious, capable, imaginative, 
independence, intellectual, logical, self-respect. The ten items that we considered to be 
‘collectivistic’ are: helpful, obedient, polite, obedience to parents, meeting all obligations, 
harmony with others, cooperative with others, a sense of belonging, observing rites and social 
rituals, and interdependent with others. 
 Before creating a single scale for each of the two value orientations from the combined 
samples, we assessed the possibility that the dimensionality of value orientation is not the same 
in the two countries. In both cases, therefore, the eigenvalues indicated undimensionality, and the 
reliability coefficients were nearly identical for individualistic value-orientation (.79 in Japan and 
.84 in the United States) and collectivistic value-orientation (.87 in Japan and .90 in the United 
States). 
 These analyses suggest that we can be justified in creating a single scale for each of the 
value orientations from the combined samples. The results from the factor analysis of the items 
are reported in Table 1. Again, the eigenvalues (see note in table) clearly indicated a single-
factor model of each orientation. 9 Reliability analysis revealed a maximum alpha of .84 with all 
nine items in the individualistic value-orientation scale and .90 with all ten items in the 
collectivistic value-orientation scale. Thus, each of the value orientations in the analysis that 
follows is a sum of z-score transformations of the corresponding items, with a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 5.95 for the individualistic value-orientation and 7.19 for the collectivistic 
value-orientation. 
 
Independent and Interdependent Self-Construals 
 One of the most successfully used measures of self-construal is the one developed by 
Gudykunst et al. (1996), designed to tap Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) conceptualization of 
independent or interdependent self-construals. All items on the independent self-construal scale 
clearly represent individuals who are unique and autonomous. All items on the interdependent 
self-construal scale, on the other hand, reflect those who are embedded in group relationships. 
For our measures of ‘Independent Self-Construal’ and ‘Interdependent Self-Construal’, 
respondents were asked to agree or disagree along a four-point scale with 14 items and 11 items, 
respectively, drawn from the measures by Gudykunst et al. (1996).10 The response options were 
‘strongly disagree’ (coded 1), ‘disagree’ (coded 2), ‘agree’ (coded 3), and ‘strongly agree’ 
(coded 4). ‘Independent Self- Construal’ included items such as ‘I try not to depend on others’ 
and ‘I take responsibility for my own actions’. Items for ‘Interdependent Self-Construal’ 
included items like ‘I consult others before making important decisions’ and ‘I will stay in a 
group if it needs me, even if I am not happy with it’. 
 Again, we considered the possibility that the dimensionality of each of the two self-
construals is not the same in the two countries. Preliminary analysis, however, suggests the 
covariance matrix proved to be similar. The eigenvalues from principal components analyses 
within each country strongly suggest one factor, with no obvious differences in patterns of factor 
loadings in the onefactor solutions. Cronbach’s alpha for the linear composite of the 14 items for 
the independent self-construal is .80 in Japan and .78 in the United States. Somewhat different 
conclusions were reached with principal components analyses of the 11 items for the 
interdependent self-construal within nations. For both nations, the Scree Tests (Cattell, 1966) 
indicate a single factor, and no major differences in factor loadings are obvious between nations. 
But the following item has a poor factor discrimination: .371 among the Japanese and .252 
among the Americans for ‘My relationships with others are more important to me than my 
accomplishments’. Our attempts to improve the one-factor model by deleting specific items 
resulted in the elimination of this item. Alpha of the other ten items for the interdependent self-
construal is .79 in Japan and .82 in the United States. 
 The results from the factor analysis of the combined American and Japanese samples are 
reported in Table 2. A principal components analysis of the combined American and Japanese 
samples yielded a single factor (see eigenvalues in Table 2). Cronbach’s alpha for the linear 
composite of the 14 items is .83 for ‘Independent Self-Construal’ and maximum when all 14 
items are included in the scale. Again, attempts to improve the one-factor model of the 
‘Interdependent Self-Construal’ by deleting specific items resulted in the elimination of the same 
item. That item has a poor factor discrimination of .299. The eigenvalues and factor loadings are 
listed in Table 2. Reliability analysis reveals that Cronbach’s alpha of .836 is maximized with the 
other ten items in the scale. Thus, each of the self-construals in the analyses that follow is a sum 
of z-score transformations of the corresponding items, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation 
of 7.89 for the independent self-construal and 6.35 for the interdependent self-construal. 
 
Culture 
Culture – that is, Japanese and American – is the key independent variable. Our hypotheses are 
that Japanese college students would score significantly lower on our measures of individualistic 
and collectivistic value orientations and independent and interdependent self-construals than 
Americans. In the analysis, culture is coded 1 for Japanese respondents and 0 for white 
Americans since all respondents with minority status are excluded from the analysis. The 
variable Japan has a mean of .54 with a standard deviation of .50. 
 
Control Variables 
 Gender. In the analysis, gender is coded 0 for females and 1 for males. For the combined 
sample, the variable Male had a mean of .58 with a standard deviation of .49. 
 Age. Both samples had restricted age distributions because of the populations from which 
they were drawn. The mean age of the US sample was 19.62 (SD = 1.55), with 91.8 percent 
between 18 and 21 years of age. The mean for the Japanese sample was 19.37 (SD = .64), with 
99.1 percent between the ages of 18 and 21. The two means were significantly different (p < 
.001). The larger standard deviation for the American sample occurred because of six 
respondents who were older than traditional college students, with a maximum age of 34 years. 
The oldest respondent in the Japanese sample was 23. When the two samples were merged, the 
overall skewness of the distribution of age was 4.26. To reduce this skewness, age was truncated 
by converting the ages of the six older US students to 23. 
 Parents’ Education. We wanted to include a measure of family socioeconomic 
status as a control variable. The questionnaire included measures of both family income and 
parents’ education. As expected, a high percentage of American respondents (10.8 percent) did 
not provide an answer to the question about parents’ income. The figure was even higher – 37.5 
percent – for Japanese respondents. The greater non-response rate for Japanese probably can be 
attributed to their greater reluctance to provide such information and the greater likelihood of not 
knowing their parents’ income. Consequently, parents’ education, rather than income, is used as 
the indicator of family socio-economic status. Given the greater variety of family forms in Japan 
(see below), we chose to simply distinguish between respondents for whom at least one parent 
had a Bachelor’s degree or higher and all other respondents. The variable Family Education, 
therefore, is a dichotomy coded 1 if at least one parent has a Bachelor’s degree or above. In the 
Japanese sample, 66.5 percent of respondents have at least one parent with a Bachelor’s degree, 
compared to 68.3 percent of the American respondents. For the combined sample, the variable 
Parents’ Education (coded 1 if at least one parent has a Bachelor’s degree or above) had a mean 
of .67 with a standard deviation of .47. 
 Two Adult Home. Because of the possible effects on individualistic and collectivistic 
tendencies of being raised in a single-parent family, and because we expected such families to be 
less common in Japan, a measure of family structure was included in the analysis. In Japan, 7.6 
percent of households with children have a single parent (Statistics Bureau, 2000), compared to 
26.7 percent in the United States (US Census, 2001a). Developing a measure of family structure 
applicable to both cultures was confounded by the greater prevalence in Japan of certain types of 
families – especially three-generation and extended families (Sugimoto, 2003) – that are rarer in 
the United States. As a compromise based on these cultural differences, we classified 
respondents into two categories – those who were raised by one adult at any time in their lives, 
and those who were always raised by two or more adults. The exact question was phrased as 
follows: ‘While growing up, how would you describe your household?’ From the various 
response categories that were provided, 84.8 percent of the American sample and 95.4 percent of 
the Japanese sample were never in a single-adult household. The variable Two Adult Home 
(coded 1 for always with two or more adults) had a mean of .91 with a standard deviation of .29. 
 ANALYSIS 
t-tests 
Table 3 reports simple comparisons, with no controls, of the Japanese and US samples for the 
value-orientation and self-construal measures. As expected, Japanese respondents score lower 
than Americans on both measures of individualistic and collectivistic value orientations, and the 
difference is significant beyond the .001 level. Likewise, our data reveal lower scores among 
Japanese than among Americans on our measures of independent and interdependent self-
construals. Again, the differences are not only significant but also substantial (p < .001). 
 
Regression Analysis 
 Not evident yet, however, is whether the cultural differences observed in Table 3 sustain 
statistically with controls for the four socio-economic variables. This issue is addressed in the 
regression analysis in Table 4 where the two samples were merged (N = 802) with Japan as a 
dummy variable (coded 1 for Japanese and 0 for white Americans) and Male, Age, Parents’ 
Education, and Two Adult Home as the control variables. 
 Individualistic Values and Independent Self-Construal To examine whether Japanese 
college students are oriented less toward individualistic values than Americans, we regressed this 
scale on Japan and the four control variables. In Table 4, the significant (p < .001) inverse Beta 
of –.482 for Japan reflects the difference, with controls for the other variables, between Japanese 
and American respondents in their tendency to have an individualistic value-orientation. The 
negative sign indicates that Japanese, as predicted, are less oriented toward such values. A 
similar analysis is reported for independent self-construal.  As before, when the control variables 
are included, the effect for Japanese is significant. The Beta indicating the direct effect for Japan 
is –.486 (p < .001), consistent with the predicted inverse relationship, is strong evidence that 
Japanese have a less independent self-construal than do Americans. Overall, therefore, Table 4 
reveals a strong tendency for the Japanese respondents to be less individualistic than the 
Americans even with controls for gender, age, parents’ education, and family structures. For both 
measures of individualism, none of the control variables have significant direct effects. 
 
 Collectivistic Values and Interdependent Self-Construal To assess whether Japanese 
college students are less collectivistic than Americans, we then regressed the two scales of 
collectivism on the dummy variable for Japan and the four control variables. Table 4 shows, with 
the control variables, that Japanese scored significantly lower on collectivistic values than did 
Americans (Beta = –.411, p < .001). 
 Similar findings are reported for interdependent self-construal. In Table 4, which contains 
the four control variables, the effect of being Japanese is substantial and significant beyond the 
.001 level. The direct effect (Beta) for Japan is –.436 in the predicted direction, indicating a 
strong tendency for the Japanese respondents to have a less interdependent self-construal. Table 
4, therefore, provides rather strong support for our second hypothesis that Japanese college 
students, compared to Americans, are oriented less toward collectivism. 
 Again, none of the control variables have significant direct effects. These findings are 
intriguing given the work of Gilligan (1982), who indicates that sex is a powerful predictor of 
collectivistic and individualistic tendencies in a US sample. But when comparing both tendencies 
across cultures, our findings indicate that culture (Japanese versus Americans) has a larger effect 
than sex. In fact, it is the only significant predictor in the table. 
 Additionally, we examined whether the two separate concepts of individualism and 
collectivism are inversely related among the Japanese, but positively related among the 
Americans. This possibility was considered by computing the partial correlations for each group 
of the respondents between the two individualism and collectivism variables, with controls for 
age, gender, parents’ education, and family structure.11 Contrary to Hofstede’s (1980) 
conceptualization, the partial correlation between ‘Individualistic Value-Orientation’ and 
‘Collectivistic Value- Orientation’ is positive (r = .395) and significant (p < .001) in Japan. But 
the partial correlation between ‘Independent Self-Construal’ and ‘Interdependent Self-Construal’ 
is essentially zero – –.049 (p = .156). 
 In the United States, the findings for the relationship between individualism and 
collectivism appear to be consistent with our expectation, but inconsistent with Hofstede’s 
conceptualization. The partial correlations of .539 between ‘Individualistic Value-Orientation’ 
and ‘Collectivistic Value-Orientation’ and .165 between ‘Independent Self-Construal’ and 
‘Interdependent Self-Construal’ are positive in the predicted direction, and both values are 
significant at the .001 level. The presence of strong positive correlations between individualism 
and collectivism is theoretically and methodologically important. Such correlations suggest that 
individualism and collectivism are not a bipolar continuum, but they co-vary positively. Those 
who are oriented more toward individualism tend to be also oriented more toward collectivism. 
And, for the American sample in the current study, this is consistently the case. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The current research has been a challenge to a widespread assumption that Japanese are 
more collectivistic than are Americans – an assumption based primarily on a plethora of 
qualitative studies on stronger ‘group-orientation’ among Japanese compared to Americans and 
some empirical evidence on lower individualism in Japan compared to the United States. To 
challenge this assumption, we have conceptualized, in accord with Freeman (1997) and 
Kagitcibasi (1987, 1994), that individualism and collectivism are two different concepts rather 
than one with two extremes. Then, drawing on the previous cross-cultural research and theories, 
we have hypothesized that the Japanese college students tend less toward individualism and 
collectivism than do Americans. Our identical survey data collected at the same time and in very 
similar settings in Japan and the United States have contained Gudykunst et al.’s (1996) 
measures of individualistic and collectivistic value orientations and independent and 
interdependent self-construals which have been used successfully in comparative studies of 
Americans and Japanese. 
 Our assertions are modest and generalization must be approached with caution. First, our 
sample of the beginning college students has a restricted age distribution, though our respondents 
are part of what Japanese scholars call the ‘global generation’ (Sugimoto, 2003). Second, our 
sample is over-representative of the highly educated. While all of them are enrolled in college, 
the sample is thus not fully representative even of this age group. Third, our analysis, because of 
the racial and ethnic homogeneity of Japanese society, is restricted to members of the dominant 
group in both counties (i.e. Japanese and Caucasians). Accordingly, the lack of variation on age, 
education, and ethnicity may have distorted the differences in the self-reported individualistic 
and collectivistic tendencies among college students in Japan and the United States. 
 Despite these shortcomings, evidence in the data supporting our hypotheses is rather 
convincing. As noted earlier, the direct effects (Beta) of Japan – with controls for sex, age, 
family type, and parents’ education – on both measures of individualism are inverse and 
significant (p < .001): –.482 for individualistic values and -.486 for independent self-construal. 
These findings support our prediction that Japanese college students tend less toward 
individualism than do Americans, and then suggest that the difference is apparent not only 
among adult samples (i.e. employees), as observed by Hofstede (1980), but also among a sample 
of young adults (i.e. college students) in the two counties. The findings for the cultural 
differences in collectivism are also consistent with our prediction. For both measures of 
collectivism, the Japanese sample has 
a significant (p < .001) inverse effect of –.411 on collectivistic values and –.436 on 
interdependent self-construal. These findings, however, can be problematic since they are 
contradictory to the traditional stereotype that Japanese, compared to Americans, are more 
collectivistic. 
 In part, we argue, this could be because our measures of collectivism are not as specific 
as they might be preferred. Perhaps the Japanese respondents might emphasize different 
collectivistic factors, while they scored significantly lower on our general measures of 
collectivistic values and interdependent selfconstrual. For one thing, there are ‘unique Japanese’ 
values and ‘unique US American’ values. It is worth noting, for example, that the concept of 
‘enryo’ (‘reserve’ or ‘restraint’), which is a response to a group pressure for conformity (Lebra, 
1976), is not readily available in the United States because ‘reserve’ or ‘restraint’ does not fully 
capture the pragmatic meaning of ‘enryo’. In the presence of this group pressure, Japanese are 
socialized to not only refrain from expressing their personal opinions that go against the 
majority, but also decline to state their desires, wishes, and preferences even when asked to state 
(Wierzbica, 1991). As the focus of I-C expands to emphasize cultural differences in this value 
dimension, the manner in which and the extent to which culturally unique values are apparent 
across cultures should, then, become a central concern, much as it has been in the qualitative 
study of I-C across cultures.  
 Additionally, it is possible that the Japanese respondents might be more contextual than 
their American counterparts: the Japanese might be more collectivistic in one context but less 
collectivistic in another, while they may, in general, be less collectivistic than the Americans. 
When considering whether or not to cooperate with groups, Japanese people, for instance, might 
consider whether they would suffer socially-imposed punishment should they not cooperate. In 
fact, Yamagishi (1988a; see also Yamagishi, 1988b), in his study of a prisoner’s dilemma game, 
found that Japanese participants, in the absence of a sanctioning system, were less inclined to 
cooperate with the group than were Americans. But, when the opportunity for mutual 
sanctioning was available, the percent of Japanese who intend to cooperate increased 
substantially by about 30 percentage points (from 44.4 to 74.6 percent), whereas the comparable 
figure for the American participants was 19 percentage points (from 56.2 to 75.5 percent). In 
their study of hospital employees, Kobayashi et al. (2001; see also Kobayashi and Grasmick, 
2002) also reported that Japanese are more likely to comply with group norms (i.e. workplace 
rules) because, compared to Americans, they perceive a greater threat of embarrassment (i.e. a 
loss of respect from significantothers). Thus, a better measure might involve items which specify 
the perceived probabilities that in-group members would detect uncooperative behavior and then 
the detection would lead to social sanctions. Perhaps a more refined measure of collectivism 
such as this, taking into account the risk of socially imposed punishment, might have produced 
results more consistent with the traditional stereotype. 
 While the measurement issue cannot be overlooked as an explanation for why the 
Japanese were significantly less collectivistic than the Americans in our data, there is another 
possibility. The past empirical evidence suggesting that Japanese are more collectivistic than 
Americans (e.g. Hofstede, 1980) tends to be studies of adult samples, while ours is a sample of 
college students. In fact, Kim et al. (1996), in their study of collectivism using a sample of 
college students, found that Japanese scored lower on collectivism than did Americans. In that 
study, as in ours, Japanese were also less oriented toward individualism. Some have argued that 
modern capitalism and participation in the global economy, over time, have made Japan and the 
Japanese younger generation less collectivistic and will continuously move them in this direction 
(see Bellah, 1985;Hayashi, 1992; Iwao, 1993). While this might be true and might be the long-
term trend in Japan, another possibility, as we have argued, is while Japan is more willing to put 
its people under pressure to act harmoniously, the importance of collectivism is not as fully 
reinforced at home. For some adolescents, this combination of societal pressure and the lack of 
parental discipline for such a societal norm could be even the vehicle through which they later 
come to rebel against collectivism. Thus, we hope that future research of collectivism, as it 
applies to these two cultures, would involve examining whether a higher level of societal 
pressure of collectivity and conformative behavior in Japan and the lack of socialization for the 
culturally expected themes (i.e. collectivism) in the Japanese family are related to the lower 
collectivism among Japanese than among Americans. Then a rather convincing conclusion could 
be reached that these two factors intertwined with each other lead to the significant difference in 
a collectivistic value orientation and an interdependent self-construal between Japanese and 
American youths. 
 In conclusion, we want to emphasize again that our findings are only a  preliminary 
examination of the differences in individualistic and collectivistic tendencies among college 
students in Japan and the US. First, our samples of college students are not representative of the 
general population in the two countries. Thus, our ability to generalize our findings is limited. 
Second, because of the racial and ethnic homogeneity of Japanese society, the analysis was 
restricted to members of the dominant group in both counties (i.e. Japanese and Caucasians). 
Third, our data do not include direct measures of societal pressure of collectivity and parental 
discipline. These measures, lacking in the current study, would strengthen the analyses. Fourth, 
we focused on Gudykunst et al.’s (1996) general scales of individualism and collectivism and 
their relationships to culture. However, future research needs to develop measures of culturally 
unique values and contextual values and incorporate them into research on differences in 
individualistic and collectivistic tendencies across cultures. Doing so, we hope, will then open 
the path for future exploration of a possibility that culture might be seen much more 
differentiated. 
 Finally and more importantly, we would encourage others not to lose sight of the 
importance of the distinction between individualism and collectivism. While the cultural 
variability of I-C was conceptualized by Hofstede (1980; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2004) as a 
bipolar continuum, it is not reasonable to view that a culture and its people who are oriented 
more toward individualism than others are automatically oriented less toward collectivism. Thus, 
we would hope future comparative research to address the kinds of issues noted above and, then,  
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NOTES 
1.  College students, we argue, are a logical choice as a sample of respondents in testing 
 whether individual-level behavior can be fully explained by the cultural-level scores 
 regarding this dimension of cultural variability (i.e. individualism-collectivism). 
 Current Japanese college students are part of what Japanese scholars call the ‘global 
 generation’ (Sugimoto, 2003), to distinguish them from their predecessors – the 
 wartime generation, postwar generation, and prosperity generation. They tend to 
 be more pessimistic about the job market. At the same time, they were born in a 
 period of declining birthrates and tend to have been raised with no or few siblings 
 and unconditional love from their parents. Therefore, it is likely that they are less 
 collectivistic than the generations of Japanese who preceded them. 
 
2.  College undergraduate students were chosen as respondents for two reasons. First, we 
 had easier access to them in both countries than to younger adolescents or to adults. 
 Second, the Japanese college undergraduate students, as noted above, are part of 
 what Japanese scholars call the ‘global generation’ (Sugimoto, 2003). We realize, of 
 course, that people who do not attend college are excluded from our research design 
 and might be more (or less) individualistic and/or collectivistic than those who do 
 attend college. But the inclusion of only college students was a constant across the 
 two samples. 
 
3.  During the four months of preparing the first draft of the questionnaire, the Japanese 
 Author discussed translation/cultural issues with four kinds of colleagues: those who 
 were bilingual with Japanese as their native language, those who were bilingual 
 with English as their native language, those who spoke only Japanese, and those 
 who spoke only English. Although the draft of the questionnaire was not subjected 
 to a formal ‘back translation’ (Matsumoto and Juang, 2004), in effect that process 
 occurred for each questionnaire item as it was being developed in Japanese. The 
 Japanese author then pre-tested the questionnaire in face-to-face interviews with a 
 monolingual and a bilingual for whom Japanese was their native language, resulting 
 in a few minor changes. Finally, the questionnaire was administered to a class of 30 
 Japanese college students as the last pre-test. No further changes resulted from this 
 pre-test, suggesting that the Japanese author had successfully completed a version of 
 the English questionnaire that would be meaningful to Japanese individuals like the 
 ones eventually selected to be respondents in Japan. 
 
4.  The month of April was crucial to obtain students from both countries at approximately 
 the same stages of their academic careers. While an academic year begins 
 in late August or early September in universities in the US, the Japanese academic 
 year begins in April. Thus, we chose to gather data in April 2003. We expected the 
 vast majority of US students in the Introduction to Sociology class then would be 
 nearing the end of their freshman or sophomore year. In fact, 50 percent of the 
 US respondents were freshmen and another 30 percent were sophomores. In the 
 Japanese university, we gathered data in courses at the onset of the sophomore year. 
 Had we chosen freshman level courses in Japan, the students in the Japanese sample, 
 unlike those in the US sample, would have had hardly any experience as college 
 students at the time the data were collected. Indeed, 93 percent of the respondents 
 in the Japanese sample were beginning sophomores. 
 
5.  Japanese students must declare a major before their admission to a university. 
 In essence, there is no equivalent to an Introduction to Sociology (or any other 
 subject) course taken by a large number of students outside their major. 
 
6.  Prior to the distribution of the questionnaire, students were informed that 
 participation in the study was voluntary and both the anonymity of the respondent 
 and the confidentiality of their responses were guaranteed. The questionnaires were 
 then distributed to those who agreed to participate in the study. 
 
7.  We had to address the wide discrepancy between Japanese national and American 
 state universities in racial and ethnic diversity, a discrepancy so wide that ‘minority 
 group’ status could not be a variable in our analysis. Race/ethnicity is included, at 
 least as a control, in tests of individualism-collectivism in the United States. We knew 
 in advance, however, that this would be problematic in our research because of the 
 racial and ethnic homogeneity of Japan. Whereas 75 percent of the US population is 
 white (US Census, 2001b), typical estimates are that 95 to 98 percent in the Japanese 
 population is racially and ethnically Japanese (Kerbo, 2000). According to a recent 
 assessment (Sugimoto, 2003), only 5.4 million (slightly over 4 percent) of the 126.9 
 million residents of Japan are classified as members of ‘minority groups’. Had we 
 included a variable for race/ethnicity, separating minority group members from 
 others, that variable would have been collinear with the dummy variable for Japan, 
 possibly masking the effect of Japan, independent of its race/ethnic homogeneity. 
 Consequently, our plan was to use only the questionnaires completed by Caucasian 
 students in the US, excluding those who were self-identified minority group 
 members. Likewise, we would omit from the analysis the few Japanese respondents 
 who identified themselves as ‘non-Japanese’. 
 
 8.  The gender composition of universities in Japan and the US means that the proportion 
 of males in the Japanese sample will be higher. In the American university only 
 half (51 percent) of all students were male, a figure typical of state universities in 
 the United States. In contrast, Japanese national universities are overwhelmingly 
 male. According to figures from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
 and Technology (Statistics Bureau, 2003), 66 percent of all students enrolled in all 
 national universities are males. In the particular Japanese university from which 
 we gathered data, 71 percent of all students enrolled were males. Our two samples 
 reflect these distributions. 
 
9.  Among the nine factors of individualistic values and the ten factors of collectivistic 
 values necessary to perfectly reproduce the correlation matrix, 2 of each value 
 orientation have eigenvalues greater than 1.0. According to the Kaiser Rule for 
 determining the number of factors, a two-factor solution would be appropriate 
 (Nunnally, 1967). Both an orthogonal and an oblique rotation of the two factors, 
 in general, separate each of the two components as distinct factors. However, in a 
 principal components analysis, the number of factors with eigenvalues greater than 
 1.0 is, in part, an increasing function of the number of items. With the larger number 
 of items, the Kaiser Rule are more likely to overestimate the number of significant 
 factors, and the Scree Discontinuity Test has been proposed as a preferable strategy 
 for determining the number of factors (Nunnally, 1967). According to the logic of the 
 Scree Test, the most obvious break in eigenvalues of individualistic and collectivistic 
 values is the difference of 2.87 and 4.17, respectively, between the first and second 
 factors, compared to .19 and .25 between the second and third, suggesting that a 
 onefactor model would be appropriate for each value orientation. However, we would 
 encourage others to replicate our measures and develop other items, examining their 
 unidimensionality with various kinds of samples. 
 
10.  We excluded the following work-related items because of the nature of our sample 
 (i.e. college students): ‘I consult with co-workers on work-related matters’ and ‘I try 
 to abide by customs and conventions at work’. 
 
11.  Additional analysis not reported here yielded similar findings. The correlations 
 we found in oblique rotations between individualistic and collectivistic values 
 were .310 in Japan and .437 in the US. The correlations between independent and 
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